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Abstract In the property tax literature, an ad valorem property tax is
considered equitable if all properties in the taxing jurisdiction
are subject to the same effective tax rate. That is, all properties,
regardless of value or type, should be taxed at the same
percentage of their market value. Because market value is a
theoretical construct and not directly observable, errors in
estimating market value may result in systematic inequity, with
some properties taxed at higher effective rates than others. This
study extends previous research on property tax inequity by
examining potential determinants of errors in the property
valuation process for a sample of single-family homes in Palm
Beach County, Florida. The results indicate that assessment
difﬁculty (as measured by the variation around the mean
assessment to transaction price ratio) is positively related to lot
size, living area, age of the home and the percentage of minority
residents in the neighborhood and is negatively related to market
activity levels, resident income levels, whether the property is
the permanent residence of its owner, and whether the property
has a swimming pool. The generality of these results is limited
by the use of transaction price as a proxy for unobservable
market value.
Introduction
For as long as there have been taxes there have been concerns that they be
administered equitably, and the equity of the ad valorem property tax has long
been a controversial subject. The primary criticism of the ad valorem property tax
focuses on the failure of assessing ofﬁcials to accurately estimate the value of the
properties that comprise the tax base. Given a ﬁxed tax rate for all properties in
a jurisdiction, errors in estimating value lead to inequity because not all properties
in the jurisdiction will be taxed at the same effective tax rate. The assessment
research literature generally classiﬁes such inequity into one of two categories:
vertical or horizontal inequity.154  Allen and Dare
Vertical inequity exists when there is systematic variation of assessed value from
market value across property value ranges. For example, if lower-value properties
in a taxing jurisdiction are consistently assessed at a greater proportion of their
market value in comparison to higher-value properties, then the tax structure is
considered to be regressive. Similarly, the tax structure is said to be progressive
if lower-value properties are systematically assessed at a lesser proportion of their
market value relative to higher-value properties. Numerous researchers have
considered a variety of methods for detecting vertical inequity in ad valorem
property tax systems. Relevant studies include those by Paglin and Fogarty (1972),
International Association of Assessing Ofﬁcers (IAAO) (1978), Cheng (1974),
Kochin and Parks (1982), Bell (1984), Haurin (1988), Clapp (1990), Sunderman,
Birch, Cannaday and Hamilton (1990), Sirmans, Diskin, and Friday (1995),
Benson and Schwartz (1997), De Cesare and Ruddock (1998), Spahr and
Sunderman (1998), Benson and Schwartz (2000) and Smith (2000).
Other researchers have considered the issue of horizontal inequity in ad valorem
property tax systems. Horizontal inequity refers to systematic variation of assessed
value from market value across properties with similar market values due to
assessors’ inability to accurately determine the impact of certain property and
neighborhood factors on market value. Berry and Bednarz (1975) report that larger
houses, houses occupied by African-Americans and older houses result in
systematic assessor error. Kowalski and Colwell (1986) present results that
indicate assessors tend to systematically over assess larger industrial properties,
but that the importance of other property characteristics such as frontage and lot
depth is underestimated for industrial properties. Haurin (1988) examines housing
data from Ohio and ﬁnds that assessment error increases with difﬁcult to observe
property characteristics and property age, and declines with income level and the
percentage of African-Americans in the property neighborhoods. He also reports
that the manner in which assessors collect information about the properties
(interior inspections versus verbal interviews with the occupant) affects assessment
accuracy. Using data from three counties in Washington, Goolsby (1997) ﬁnds
that assessors tend to under assess older houses and over assess larger houses and
houses with a larger percentage of value represented by land value. He ﬁnds mixed
evidence of signiﬁcant relationships between assessment error and lot size and
waterfront lots across the counties included in his study. Similarly, DeCesare and
Ruddock (1998) consider horizontal inequity in the assessment of residential
apartments in Brazil and ﬁnd evidence of systematic assessment errors related to
a variety of property characteristics, including geographic location, location of the
apartments within the building, building characteristics and apartment quality.
The purpose of this study is to extend the research on horizontal property tax
inequity by examining potential determinants of assessment error using sample
data (single-family residential properties) from Florida. The data are from a county
that, like others in the state, uses statistics-based, computer-aided mass appraisal
models (augmented with ﬁeld inspections of randomly-selected properties in theDeterminants of Property Tax Inequity  155
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jurisdiction) to estimate each property’s market value for property tax assessment
purposes as of January 1 of each year. Assessment errors for individual properties
in the sample are calculated by comparing their assessment ratios with the mean
assessment ratios for the sample. The results suggest that certain property and
neighborhood characteristics may affect the degree of difﬁculty in accurately
assessing properties, where degree of difﬁculty is measured by the amount of
variation around the mean assessment to transaction price ratio. To the extent that
transaction prices are randomly distributed around unobservable market value, the
use of transaction prices to measure assessment error limits the generality of the
ﬁndings.
 Measuring Horizontal Property Tax Inequity
Horizontal assessment inequity (INEQUITYi) for property i is deﬁned as the
absolute value of the difference between the property’s assessment ratio (ARi) and
the mean assessment ratio for the n properties in the taxing jurisdiction (AR),
where the assessment ratio for property i is deﬁned as its assessed value divided
by its market value:
INEQUITY  AR  AR, (1) ii
where ARi  AVi/MVi and   ARi/n. AR
Based on this deﬁnition, a property is inequitably assessed relative to other
properties in the taxing jurisdiction if ARi  resulting in INEQUITYi  0. AR,
(Notice that because INEQUITYi compares the assessment ratio of individual
properties with the mean assessment ratio for the jurisdiction, the measure is
robust enough to be used in taxing jurisdictions in which assessed value is limited
to some static percentage of market value, either by statute or, as Goolsby (1997)
mentions, by the desire of assessing ofﬁcials to reduce assessment appeals by
property owners.)
For the purpose of identifying determinants of inequity in property tax systems,
the following statistical model is proposed that will allow empirical testing of
various property and neighborhood characteristics that may be related to horizontal
inequity.
INEQUITY  B(X)  e. (2)
In this model, INEQUITY is the assessment error measure deﬁned in Equation 1
for property i (subscripts suppressed), X is a vector of independent variables156  Allen and Dare
(property and neighborhood characteristics) hypothesized to be related to inequity
in a taxing jurisdiction, B is a vector of parameters to be estimated and e is a
random error term. Statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients obtained from ordinary
least squares regression of the empirical model can be interpreted as indications
of horizontal inequity in the sample data. In the absence of inequity, none of the
parameters in B would be signiﬁcantly different from zero.
Specifying the model in this general format allows direct testing of a variety of
potential determinants of inequity in property tax systems. The measure of
assessment error and model speciﬁcation used here is similar, but not identical,
to that of Goolsby (1997) who regresses assessed value and various property
features on predicted market value, where market value is predicted by dividing
each property’s assessed value by the mean assessment ratio for the jurisdiction.
The inequity measure used here differs signiﬁcantly from that of DeCesare and
Ruddock (1998) who investigate inequity by regressing the natural log of assessed
value on various property features and from that of Haurin (1988) who regresses
sale price on assessed value and property and neighborhood characteristics.
 Description of the Data and Hypotheses
To test the model, a sample of single-family residential properties was drawn from
the tax roll of Palm Beach County, Florida. Because the measure of assessment
error (Equation (1)) requires an estimate of market value for each property, the
sample includes only those properties that were transferred via recorded warranty
deed between private parties between January 1 and August 31, 2001 (8,465
identiﬁed transfers). The data were screened following the methods demonstrated
by Goolsby (1997) in an effort to ensure that the transaction prices were
reasonable indicators of market value. In particular, we eliminated transactions
between parties with the same family name, transactions involving corporate
owners and lending institutions, transactions involving multiple parcels and
transactions involving newly-constructed properties. Observations with missing
data were also eliminated. The data include information on each property’s most
recent assessed value (as of January 1, 2001), most recent transaction price,
physical features and location descriptors. Descriptive statistics for the ﬁnal
sample of 5,262 observations are provided in Exhibit 1.
An important statistic in Exhibit 1 is the mean assessment ratio for the data
sample. Even though state law requires that all properties be assessed at 100% of
market value, the sample displays a mean assessment ratio of approximately 77%.
As noted by Goolsby (1997), assessing ofﬁcials may systematically assess
property values below market value in an effort to minimize assessment appeals.
As long as the assessment ratio is identical across all properties, however, the tax
system poses no inherent inequity. Inequity results when an individual property
is assessed at an assessment ratio that is different from other properties in the
jurisdiction. The inequity measure deﬁned in Equation 1 addresses this issue.Determinants of Property Tax Inequity  157
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Exhibit 1  Descriptive Statistics and Variable Deﬁnitions
Variable Mean Deﬁnition
AVALUE $155,487 Most recent assessed value (January, 2001)
$109,332
PRICE $205,369 Most recent transaction price (January–August 2001)
$145,173
INEQUITY 0.075 Absolute value of the difference between the property’s as-
sessment ratio (ARi) and the mean assessment ratio for the
n properties in the taxing jurisdiction (), where the assess-
ment ratio for property i is deﬁned as its assessed value di-
vided by its most recent transaction price.
0.071
AR 0.766 Ratio of assessed value to transaction price
0.103
MONTHS 4.948 Months between assessment date and transaction date
2.136
SQFT 1,952 Living area (in square feet)
787
LOTSIZE 19,728 Lot size (in square feet)
30,021
AGE 18.904 Age of the dwelling (in years)
11.361
POOL 0.398 Binary variable indicating whether or not the property has
a swimming pool
HOMESTEAD 0.623 Binary variable indicating whether or not the property is
the permanent residence of its owner
RECENT 0.145 Binary variable indicating whether or not the property was
sold within previous two years
ACTMKT 206.591 Measure of market activity (number of sales in sample
within subject property’s zip code area)
114.523




Percentage of minority population by census tract of sample
properties
Note: n  5,262. Standard deviations appear beneath the means.158  Allen and Dare
It is important to acknowledge that transaction price is not a perfect proxy for
market value, even after the screening process described. As noted by Haurin
(1988), Sunderman, Birch, Cannaday and Hamilton (1990) and Smith (2000)
(among others), transaction prices may reﬂect factors other than property value,
including atypical marketing times, personal property included in the transaction,
unusual ﬁnancing, atypical buyer and seller motivations, and information
asymmetries.1
Another issue regarding the use of transaction price as an indicator of market
value is the fact that assessed values and transactions prices are not necessarily
related to the same date. In Florida, each county-elected property assessor certiﬁes
the assessed value of all taxable properties as of January 1 of each year after
sending notices of the intended assessment to the owner of record in October of
the prior year. The owner then has the right to appeal the assessment (ﬁrst through
a value-adjustment board, then through the court system) prior to ﬁnal
certiﬁcation. Possible changes in market conditions between the date of the
certiﬁed assessed value and the transaction date could render transaction price
obsolete as an indicator of market value. This issue was addressed [following
Clapp (1990) and Sirmans, Diskin and Friday (1995)] by adding a time trend
variable (MONTHS) to the statistical model that measures months between
assessment date and transaction date.
The remaining independent variables were selected to measure property and
neighborhood/market characteristics that may be related to assessment error. Data
limitations prevent consideration of all potential determinants of horizontal
inequity suggested in prior studies. Notably, the data do not include ‘‘repeat sales’’
as used by Haurin (1988), so his measure of ‘‘difﬁcult to observe attributes’’could
not be measured nor was there detailed information about how the assessor
collected the information about each property.
The independent variables included in the analysis are potential determinants of
assessment error. In particular, we hypothesize that assessment difﬁculty is
affected by each property’s features and neighborhood characteristics. Speciﬁcally,
we hypothesize that larger properties present more assessment difﬁculty. We test
this hypothesis using the variables SQFT (living area in square feet for each
property) and LOT (lot size in square feet for each property).
Similarly, the age of a home and the presence of a swimming pool were
hypothesized to contribute signiﬁcantly to the uniqueness of each home and thus
may present more difﬁcult assessment tasks. These hypotheses were tested using
the variables AGE (age in years of the structure) and POOL (a binary variable
equal to 1 if the property had a swimming pool).
Although all of the properties in the sample were single-family homes, a portion
of the properties were not the permanent residence of their owners and may
represent second homes or rental properties. This characteristic (which is knownDeterminants of Property Tax Inequity  159
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to the assessment ofﬁcer at the time of assessment) was tested to see whether it
affected assessment error. The variable HOMESTEAD is a binary variable equal
to 1 if the property is the permanent residence of its owner and zero otherwise.
Another potential determinant of assessment error was whether the property had
been sold within the two preceding years of the assessment date. If a property
had been sold, the assessing ofﬁcial may be able to use the recent transaction
price to improve the accuracy of the assessment. To test this hypothesis, the binary
variable RECENT was included, which was set equal to 1 if the property sold
within the previous two years (1999 or 2000).
Along the same line of thought, the study also considered whether properties that
were located in more active markets represented a less difﬁcult assessment task
than those that tradee in ‘‘thin’’markets. The variable ACTMKT counts the number
of transactions in the sample for each property by neighborhood (zip-code area).
The variables PCI and PMINORITY, which refer to the per capita income and
percentage of minority residents in each property’s census tract, respectively, were
included to test to test the hypotheses that residents’ income levels and proportion
of minority residents in neighborhoods affect the degree of assessment difﬁculty
as suggested by some prior studies.
 Analysis and Results
Exhibit 2 shows the ordinary least squares results obtained from regressing
INEQUITY on the independent variables. The null hypothesis for each variable is
Bj  0. Five percent is the level of statistical signiﬁcance throughout.
The coefﬁcients on SQFT, LOT, AGE and PMINORITY are positively related to
assessment error. Recall that the values for INEQUITY are absolute deviations
from the mean error, so positive coefﬁcients indicate increasing (decreasing)
assessment error with increasing (decreasing) values of the independent variables.
Therefore, the positive coefﬁcients indicate that larger properties in terms of both
living area and lot size, older properties and properties in neighborhoods with a
higher percentage of minority residents face increased assessment error, suggesting
that the assessment task is more difﬁcult for properties with these features or
neighborhood characteristics. Similarly the negative coefﬁcients of POOL,
HOMESTEAD, ACTMKT and PCI suggest that properties with swimming pools,
properties that are permanent residences of their owners, properties located in
more active markets and properties in higher income areas display less assessment
error, suggesting that the assessment task is less difﬁcult for properties with these
features or neighborhood characteristics. The results do not indicate a signiﬁcant
relationship between inequity and whether or not the property sold within the last
two years (RECENT) or the amount of time lapsed between the most recent
transaction and the assessment date (MONTHS).2160  Allen and Dare














Notes: The dependent variable  INEQUITY; the F-Statistic  44.28*; and the number of
observations  5,262.
*Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level or higher.
To better understand the relative impact of the explanatory variables, the
standardized regression coefﬁcients (sometimes called ‘‘beta coefﬁcients’’) were
calculated (see Exhibit 3). These coefﬁcients allow comparisons of the impact of
the independent variables scaled by the standard deviations of each variable.
(Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim and Wasserman (1996) present a detailed discussion
of the use of standardized regression coefﬁcients to compare the relative impacts
of variables.) It can be seen from the standardized coefﬁcients that an increase of
one standard deviation of SQFT, for example, holding the other variables constant,
leads to a much larger increase in assessment error (in units of standard deviations
of assessment error) than does an increase of one standard deviation of
PMINORITY, for example, when the other variables are held constant. Other
comparisons can be similarly made to discern the relative magnitudes of the
variables’ impact on assessment error. Overall, the standardized regression
coefﬁcients suggest that AGE, SQFT and LOT have the largest impacts on
assessment error for the full sample.
Previous studies have shown that inequity in the assessment process may vary
systematically across property value ranges (vertical inequity), thus the full sample
was divided into three groups based on assessed value (lowest quartile, middle
two quartiles and highest quartile). The dependent variables were calculated usingDeterminants of Property Tax Inequity  161
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Note: The dependent variable  INEQUITY.
the mean assessment ratios for each value cohort, the regression equations were
then estimated for each subsample. The results of these subsample regressions are
shown in Exhibit 4.
In general, the signiﬁcance and sign of the coefﬁcients remains consistent across
the subsample and full sample regressions. There are, however, some interesting
exceptions. While the coefﬁcients for SQFT in the lower quartile and POOL in
all of the subsamples are insigniﬁcant, it appears that these results were likely
driven by the smaller sample size of these regressions. However, the results for
ACTMKT, PCI and PMINORITY do not appear to be the result of the smaller
sample size. Rather, it appears that there are deﬁnite differences between the
samples. Activity in a market (ACTMKT) and differences in area income (PCI)
appear not to reduce assessor error for lower-value properties. On the other hand,
the percentage of minority residents in the neighborhood (PMINORITY)i s
signiﬁcant only for the lower quartile sample. The signiﬁcance of this coefﬁcient
in the full sample may be primarily driven by the lower-quartile properties.
These subsample regression results suggest that the relationships between the
variables and assessment error may vary systematically across the value sub-
samples. Chow tests were performed between the coefﬁcients of the three
subsamples to test this. The results indicate that the middle-quartiles’ coefﬁcients
are different from those of the lower and upper quartiles (respective F-Statistics
of 3.77 and 3.60, signiﬁcant at the 1% level). However, no signiﬁcant difference
between the regression coefﬁcients of the lower and upper quartile samples (F-
Statistic of 1.45) was found.162  Allen and Dare







Intercept 0.020 0.006 0.046
(0.87) (0.617) (2.79)
SQFT 8.66e-06 2.97e-05* 1.48e-05*
(1.06) (9.90) (5.53)
LOT 3.15e-07* 4.34e-07* 1.78e-07*
(2.74) (9.66) (3.77)
AGE 0.001* 0.001 0.002*
(5.14) (9.21) (7.28)
POOL 0.014 0.003 0.005
(1.56) (1.72) (0.96)
HOMESTEAD 0.013* 0.012* 0.008*
(2.77) (4.64) (2.06)
RECENT 0.008 0.003 0.005
(1.29) (0.87) (1.11)
ACTMKT 1.81e-05 2.8e-05* 2.8e-05
(0.64) (2.29) (1.35)
PCI 5.83e-07 4.52e-07 8.90e-07*
(0.79) (1.81) (2.23)
PMINORITY 0.038* 0.012 0.010
(2.54) (1.15) (0.53)
MONTHS 0.001 0.000 0.000
(1.12) (0.302) (0.30)
R2 0.0561 0.0975 0.0846
F-Statistic 7.76* 28.28* 12.05*
Notes: The dependent variable  INEQUITY based on group means rather than full sample mean. t-
Statistics are in parentheses.
aBased on assessed value.
bNumber of observations  1,316.
cNumber of observations  2,630.
*Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level or higher.
 Conclusion
In the property tax literature, an ad valorem property tax is considered equitable
if all properties in the taxing jurisdiction are taxed at the same proportion to their
market value. In other words, all properties, regardless of value or type, should
be subject to the same effective tax rate. This study extends the literature on
property tax equity by examining potential determinants of assessment error usingDeterminants of Property Tax Inequity  163
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sample data (single-family residential properties) from Florida. While some of
these determinants have been considered in earlier studies, this study is the ﬁrst
to consider whether the level of market activity and whether recent transactions
involving the properties in the sample (prior to the assessment date) signiﬁcantly
affect the degree of difﬁculty of the assessment process.
Overall, the most signiﬁcant contribution of this study is the use of a unique
measure of inequity that compares the assessment ratio of each property with the
mean assessment ratio for all properties, where the assessment ratio is deﬁned as
assessed value divided by transaction price. Though certainly not a perfect proxy
for unobservable market value, transaction prices are the best indicator of market
value available. This variable was regressed on various property and neighborhood
characteristics including the size of the property (lot size and living area), structure
age, whether the property is a homestead, whether the property has a pool, the
total number of transactions in the neighborhood, whether the property has sold
in the two years prior to the study period, the income level of the residents of the
neighborhood and the percentage of minority residents in the neighborhood.
Evidence suggests that some of these property and neighborhood characteristics
are related to horizontal assessment inequity, with some variables being positively
related and others being negatively related. These ﬁndings support the notion
that assessment difﬁculty is affected by certain property and neighborhood
characteristics, where assessment difﬁculty is measured by the amount of variation
around the mean assessed value to transaction price ratio.
 Endnotes
1 A hedonic pricing model was also considered to estimate market values (as some other
researchers have done), but, as Gatzlaff and Haurin (1998) explain, properties that sell
in any given time period may not be representative of all properties (sold and unsold) in
the market and it is therefore not clear that this strategy would result in an improved
measure of market value for properties in our sample. As noted by an anonymous
reviewer, transaction prices are randomly distributed around market value, so there may
be an inherent errors-in-variables problem that limits the generality of our analysis and
results.
2 At the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, the potential interaction effects between
several of these variables, including percentage minority, lot size, square feet, age, pool
and income were also considered. None of the interaction variables proved signiﬁcant at
the 5% level, so the results were omitted from the discussion.
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